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[A] COMBINATION OF EASE of access, and the demands of new businesses,
[have] contributed toward a shift towards viewing copyright works as simply
‘content’ needed to make a particular project work. It has also led to increased
pressure on copyright owners, both to release their works for exploitation by
others, and to do so more and more cheaply. – Cliodhna O’Sullivan, Public
Affairs and Ireland, Summer .
 could be said to represent a watershed of sorts in the Irish public’s conscious-
ness of copyright law. June th of that year was the th anniversary of Blooms-
day, and events, under the umbrella of the ‘ReJoyce Festival’ were organised all over
Ireland to mark it. Some, famously, ran square up against the intransigence of the
Joyce estate, notorious up to then in some (legal, academic) circles for its tight grip
on the copyright of James Joyce’s work; in the wake of ’s Bloomsday celebra-
tions, this notoriety soon became widespread.
It’s an act of rebellion to stand and read aloud from James Joyce – it’s as if
we’re in the s again. – Helen Monaghan, director of the James Joyce
Centre, Sunday Business Post,  June .
Media coverage of the estate’s challenges to those who wished to exploit Joyce’s
work during the Bloomsday celebrations was extensive, and uniformly condemna-
tory of the estate. The media’s condemnation revolved around an idea that the Joyce
estate was exercising unreasonable control over (it was implied) works which were
the cultural and spiritual property of the Irish nation. Spectacularly, the Irish gov-
ernment, acting in response to a letter received from the estate’s solicitors, rushed
an amendment to the  Copyright and Related Rights Act through the Seanad to
allow for the public display of Joyce manuscripts in the National Library. (The pur-
chase of these manuscripts was itself the subject of some controversy, beyond the
scope of this paper.) The original act had made no provision for such display. The
estate did not specifically threaten legal action, but merely pointed out that the gov-
ernment’s intended exhibition of the manuscripts would be in breach of copyright.
The latter’s response was the insertion of a new subsection (A) into section  of
the act:
For the avoidance of doubt, no infringement of any right created by this Part
in relation to an artistic or literary work occurs by reason of the placing on
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display the work, or a copy thereof, in a place or premises to which members
of the public have access. (Copyright and Related Rights (Amendment) Act,
.)
The events described above raise a number of issues. In no particular order: a jaun-
diced media and public attitude toward copyright; the interests of copyright holders;
the interests of those who wish to exploit copyrighted works; and, though it is an
extreme example, the malleability of copyright legislation in the face of powerful
lobby groups. (This example is extreme as the lobby group in question is also the
group with the power to amend legislation; also, the amendment was couched in
terms of its being ‘for the avoidance of doubt’).
As a jumping off point for an examination of the increased demand for easy and
cheap exploitation of copyrighted works the Bloomsday controversies are salient
because they reflect a conflict between the rights holders of traditional content (i.e.
literary works) and traditionally powerful elites – government, academics, and other
arbiters of elite culture. Because the battle was fought between elites, I would argue
that it helped to normalise the idea that the exploitation of copyright content was
permissible and desirable in a way that contests over new media (such as A & M
Records Inc vs Napster and MGM vs. Grokster) could not.
Intellectual Property laws confer an exclusive right to exploit an invention or cre-
ation commercially for a limited period. These rights are essentially negative in that
they protect the copying of the protected innovations. They do not ensure prof-
itability but if the Intellectual Property Right is combined with a successful product
the legal exclusivity provides a stimulus to innovation by acting both as a reward to
the inventor or creator, and as a stimulus to innovation more generally (Anderton,
). Copyright represents a balancing act by legislators between different interests.
On the one hand, it offers protection, as noted, to innovators, and in so doing seeks
to foster further innovation. On the other, it also reflects a perceived public interest
in facilitating certain kinds of access to copyrighted works that do not require the
copyright holder’s permission. These are known as ‘fair dealing exemptions’ (‘fair
use’ in the US). Fair dealing exemptions inscribed in Irish law include certain types
of non-commercial use (such as for research or study) (Copyright and Related Rights
(Amendment) Act, article ) and uses for the purposes of criticism, review, or the
reporting of current events (article ).
The question of copyright law and copyright norms arises with each round of tech-
nological innovation. Copyright and digital rights are the issue of the moment, but we
should bear in mind that copyright law, while pledged to uphold innovation, has
inscribed within it the struggle to keep pace with this innovation. For example, Kaplan
() stated some time ago:
As a veteran listener at many lectures by copyright specialists over the past
decade, I know it is almost obligatory for a speaker to begin by invoking the
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 However, the comments of some Dáil members on the introduction of the amendment should be noted. Bren-
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original Joyce works’, while Philip Hogan of Fine Gael observed ‘I am strongly of the view that we should not
legislate our way out of problems at every hand’s turn’ (Dáil Éireann, ).
communications revolution of our time, [and] then to pronounce upon the
inadequacies of the present copyright act (p. ).
Were we so minded, we could go back as far as  for examples of the balancing
act between protection and innovation. The first legislation for copyright, the Statute
of Anne, was brought into law in Britain on foot of the activities of ‘printers, book-
sellers, and other persons [who] have of late frequently taken the liberty of printing,
reprinting, and publishing … books, and other writings, without the consent of the
authors or proprietors of such books and writings’ – activities made possible by the
declining cost and increasing availability of printing presses.
We shall go back only as far as the s, to the original modern copyright case
célèbre – Sony vs Universal City Studios () (the Betamax case) in the US.
Sony were sued for their distribution of the VCR recorder. The entertainment
industry perceived the VCR, which enabled the public to record and copy film and
broadcast content, as a massive threat. The judgement in that case found that the
fact that a VCR has infringing uses was not enough for the finding of contributory
infringement by the manufacturers, Sony. In England, CBS Songs vs Amstrad Con-
sumer Electronics PLC., (), (the latter, a manufacturer of double cassette decks)
was the test case for contributory infringement, and was decided in favour of the
manufacturer. This case paved the way for newer reproduction technologies such as
MP players. It is significant to note, as will become clear below, that in neither
case did the entertainment industry pursue individual users of either VCRs or double
cassette recorders for infringement.
Napster was the first company to allow individuals to download freely and quickly
large quantities of copyrighted content. It was found liable for copyright infringement
in the US on the basis that while the company did not itself download the songs, it
did have the songs on its server. In the wake of this judgement, ‘peer to peer’ (PP)
software was developed. This software was created in part to circumvent the liabil-
ity of a central server holding copyrighted content. As the term implies, PP soft-
ware allows users’ computers to communicate and share files directly. It also leaves
individual users, rather than the PP software developers or distributors, open to lia-
bility for copyright infringement. And, indeed, many were found so liable, creating
a wave of negative publicity for record industries all over the world.
In  the US Supreme Court – in MGM Studios vs. Grokster Limited
() – found against the latter, a firm which distributed free PP software.
MGM had sued Grokster for copyright infringement on the basis that the defen-
dants had knowingly and intentionally distributed their software to enable users to
infringe copyright works. The judgement hinged on the fact that Grokster was
seen to have induced copyright infringement through its publicity material, and as
such was quite particular to this case, however, it was seen at the time as signifi-
cant, as it suggested that if PP software distributors could be found liable for con-
tributory infringement, the record industry would be less likely to sue individuals,
and would make these companies targets for redress instead. The industry, how-
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ever, continued in its pursuit of individual infringers; the Washington Post
(//) reported in  that more than , lawsuits had been filed in the
US against individual downloaders; in Ireland, June  saw IRMA obtain a High
Court Order to obtain the names and addresses of  individual downloaders, with
a view to prosecution (www.irma.ie/index.htm).
PP filesharing is unlikely to fall into the rubric of fair use in any jurisdiction -
the copyright holders, in this instance, very firmly do have the right of law on their
side. The fashion in which they have sought to uphold these rights, however, has
been unfortunate. It has painted the content providers as cruel behemoths stomping
on the little guy, with the little guy consequently losing some of his moral ambiva-
lence about receiving content for free.
The European Union Information Society Directive was passed in  in an
effort to harmonise copyright law across the Union. Its list of fair use exceptions,
like the Irish list, is limited: ‘teaching, scientific research, and certain other private
study purposes’, ‘criticism, review, caricature, parody and pastice’ and ‘certain pur-
poses relating to the dissemination of news, political speeches and public lectures’
(article ()). Such an exhaustive list of exceptions, argue some, was ill-conceived,
and poorly fixed to deal with the rapid developments in information technology (see
Hugenholtz, ). In , the EU announced a fresh set of copyright directives,
commonly known as IPRED (European Parliament, ). However they did not
take the opportunity to expand the scope of fair use:
Member States shall ensure that the fair use of a protected work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or audio or by any other means, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or
research, does not constitute a criminal offence (article ).
Developments in copyright law in the US and the EU have been argued to be ‘a
story of increasing monopoly … [and] progressive expansion of reward’ for copyright
holders, according to Daithi O’Dell (), writing on the Cearta blog. O’Dell argues
that ‘every extension of the reach of copyright protection should have been accom-
panied by a concommitant flexibility in the exceptions, such as fair dealing’. This, he
argues, has not happened, and ‘the relationship has become progressively unbalanced
and is now increasingly tilted toward the copyright holder’.
This imbalance in copyright protection is well illustrated by digital rights man-
agement technologies (DRMs). DRMs are incorporated into much legally available
online content, as well as DVDs, and, in the US, into some television broadcasts (to
prevent their storage on new hard-drive recorders like TiVo). They tether digital
works to particular platforms to prevent format shifting. The US Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (: U.S.C. article (a) (b)), specifically encourages their use
as does the EU’s IPRED. In , in response to submissions by, among others,
the anti-DRM lobby group the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the US Copyright
Office asserted its position thus:
At most, (anti-DRM) commentators have asserted that technological measures
have made it difficult to make copies of musical and audio-visual works for
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use on other devices – a use that is either infringing, or, even if it were non-
infringing, would be merely a convenience which is insufficient to support a
claim for an exemption’ (US Copyright Office, ).
In a keynote address to OSCOM (the International Association for Open Source
Content Management) in  Stanford Law Professor and founder of the Stanford
Centre for Internet and Society Lawrence Lessig noted that legal usage of copyright
works is tri-partite. It consists of regulated use (uses specifically covered in a copy-
right license); unregulated use (not regulated by copyright licenses, but not neces-
sarily illegal – as an example of unregulated use he suggests sitting on a book), and
fair use. He argues that the concept of fair use has suffered most with the advent of
DRM technology. Where previously users could engage in fair and unregulated uses
of works (lending a book to a friend; creating a collage of copyrighted photographs
for a non-commercial purpose as examples of each) without fear of legal reprisal, the
traceability of unregulated or non-regulated acts, along with the restrictions imposed
on use by DRM technology, has had the result that ‘the use of creative output [has
never] been more controlled’. Regulation of the use of copyright works has been
taken from the hands of legislators and vested instead in those with an interest in
protecting such works: ‘Technology is better at controlling how online media is used
than the law is at controlling its use in the real world’. Not only is policing technol-
ogy far easier and more effective than real world policing of copyright infringement,
it leaves no room for examination of individual cases as they arise. While European
fair usage exemptions are limited, as noted, post-hoc judgement on such cases offers
at least the prospect of a degree of wriggle room for defendants. As the British Court
of Appeals, in deciding on the case of Ashdown vs Telegraph Group ()
observed ‘It [is] necessary for the Court to look closely at the facts of individual cases
– as indeed it must whenever a ‘fair dealing’ defense is raised’.
The demands of users, despite the best efforts of the entertainment industry, are
making themselves felt. The inconvenience of DRM technologies are, in fact – contrary
to the US Copyright Office’s assertion – sufficient to support a claim for exemption.
One online music store (digital.com) reports that non-DRM protected music outsells
its protected counterpart four-to-one (reported in the Guardian, //). In light of
figures like this, almost certainly, EMI announced in late  that it would remove
DRM protection from content sold through iTunes, while Universal made a similar
move, removing protection from classical and jazz music downloads.
Every time a user transfers a song from CD to MP in Ireland (s)he infringes
copyright, under article  () of the Copyright and Related Rights Act . The
vast disparity between the law and public norms is well demonstrated in this. Mil-
lions of songs are format shifted annually in Ireland by hundreds of thousands of
MP player users, many of whom are unaware that they are in breach of copyright
in doing so; many of whom would think its illegality ludicrous if they did know.
Even for those enjoying, under law, a ‘privileged exception’ which allows them to
legally format shift – lecturers and students needing extracts from DRM protected
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media; or the physically handicapped, who need to format shift media to make it access-
ible, amongst others – DRM is frustrating. In the first empirical study of its kind,
Patrícia Akester () looked at how DRM impacted on such groups – such as the
British Library, film lecturers and students, and the blind or sight-impaired (who need
to run e-books through a screen reader to create accessible audio or large text versions).
She found that all of these groups reported frustrations with DRM, as it is too blunt a
tool to allow for their privileged exceptions. There is a complaints and redress
procedure available, but in general it was found to be too cumbersome to be useful.
Consequently, at least in the case of film lecturers and students, as well as the sight-
impaired, many individuals are resorting to what is coyly described in the paper as
‘self-help’ measures to circumvent DRM – in other words, they are downloading
illegal copies of films or books unencrypted with the technology.
Europe is tending to be more progressive than the US in realigning law and
norm. In Britain, The Gowers Review of Intellectual Property () recommends a
‘limited private copying exception, which will allow customers to format shift legiti-
mately purchased content’. Commenting on the review, the British Intellectual Prop-
erty Office () notes in connection with format shifting:
The current law is difficult to enforce in this area. Not only may it be diffi-
cult to justify the illegality of such an activity but, because the restrictions are
seen as unreasonable, they can often be damaging to the public’s perception of
copyright. Many consumers simply do not understand why the act of trans-
ferring music from CDs they own to their MP players is illegal (para. ).
It may be too late. The lack of initiative shown by legislators to remedy ‘unreason-
able’ copyright restrictions, married to the ease with which these restrictions can be
circumvented, has already given rise to a mass infringement culture, itself generative
of consumer disdain for copyright.
The European Union, also too late, is making moves to address the issue. A press
release of rd January  notes that ‘Europe’s content sector is suffering under …
serious disagreements between stakeholders … about fundamental issues such as pri-
vate copying’ (IP//, http://ec.europa.eu). The same press release stated that
‘the demand and preferences of  million customers are the strongest arguments
for achieving new solutions at EU level’. It stops short of recommending a private
copying exception, suggesting instead that ‘[t]echnologies that support the manage-
ment of rights and the fair remuneration of creators in an online environment can be
a key enabler for the development of innovative business models’.
The internet is perhaps unique, despite the caveats regarding copyright’s rela-
tionship to technological innovation above. Lawrence Lessig characterises its unique-
ness in terms of the development of a ‘Read-Write’ culture as distinct from the
‘Read-Only’ culture that prevailed prior to its ubiquity. Where once our interaction
with copyrighted material was on the level of passive consumption, the internet and
associated technologies have allowed users to engage with and modify copyrighted
material in ways and on a scale never before seen. He uses the example of ‘machin-
ima’ and mash-up culture (editing separate audio and visual elements to create some-
thing new; or simply editing one or the other). Mash-ups are the logical end-point
of a view of copyrighted work as simply ‘content’, in one conception; or as prime
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exemplars of the ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’ relation between copyrighted
work and innovations derived therefrom (see www.ted.com/talks/view/id/).
Neither Napster nor Grokster, the Irish National Library nor Sony, nor the man-
ufacturers of MP players or hard-drive recorders were or are disinterested parties
in the battle for access to copyrighted content. All, with the exception of the Irish
National Library, sought to gain some financial advantage from the exploitation of
content. Despite this, the war for access to content has somehow become a moral
one. The abject failure of legislation to keep pace with the rapidity of technological
advances in the past decade has meant that the public have gained access to tech-
nologies which enable them to freely and easily infringe copyright. Knowing that the
technology for conveniently copying and sharing content exists, there is an inevitable
public backlash when protective fences are thrown up post-hoc, either by content
providers or legislators. With reference to Lessig’s observation of the disparity
between the policing of copyright in the real world and in the tech world, the dogged
pursuit of individual infringers has startled and antagonised users. As John Tehran-
ian (: ) observes:
While there may be a vast disparity between what activities the Copyright Act
proscribes and what the average American might consider fair or just, a lack
of aggressive enforcement has long prevented this fundamental tension from
coming to a head in the past. As technology improves, however, enforcement
is becoming increasingly practicable (: ).
This law/norm disparity is becoming more and more marked thanks to a combi-
nation of legislative lethargy and energetic technological innovation. This makes a
mockery of the law. Enforcement seems arbitrary and unfair, coming as it does after
the establishment of normative infringing behaviours. Where copyright holders main-
tain the right of law, they are coming to be seen more and more as aggressors, thanks
in no small part to the methods employed to assert those rights. Now that it is
common to view copyright holders as aggressive, wealthy monopolists, I find it hard
to envisage a future in which the pressure relents on content providers to release
their work for exploitation, and to do so more and more cheaply.
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